

Message Text

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21/14

ACTION EA-14

INFO OCT-01 EUR-25 NEA-10 ISO-00 DRC-01 OC-06 CCO-00 IO-15

OMB-01 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-07 H-03 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00

NSC-10 PA-03 RSC-01 PRS-01 SPC-03 SS-15 USIA-15

ACDA-19 /163 W

----- 118572

R 010800Z OCT 73

FM AMEMBASSY SAIGON

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7607

INFO AMEMBASSY JAKARTA

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

USDEL JEC PARIS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SAIGON 17225

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: MARR, VS, IR

SUBJECT: ICCS: INITIAL IMPRESSIONS OF IRANIAN AMB SADRI

REF: SAIGON 17188

1. DURING CONVERSATION REFTEL, AMB SADRI EXPANDED ON SOME OF THE
ICCS PROBLEMS HE HAS SEEN IN FIRST FEW DAYS IN SAIGON.

2. SADRI SAID HE BELEVES FOR ICCS TO BECOME EFFECTIVE IT MUST PUT
ITS OWN HOUSE IN ORDER. HE IS APPALLED AT THE INEFFICIENCY AND INE-
FFECTIVENESS OF THE SECRETARIAT. ARRIVING ON THE SCENE SOME EIGHT
MONTHS AFTER ICCS GOT ESTABLISHED, HE IS SURPRISED TO FIND THAT
SECRETARIAT UNABLE TO MOVE QUICKLY TO ANSWER SIMPLEST REQUEST, SUCH
AS FOR PAPER AND PENCILS.

3. EMBOFF EXPLAINED THAT SECRETARIAT ROLE AND FUNCTIONS WERE NOT
DESCRIBED IN PROTOCOL; THUS INITIAL MEMBERS OF COMMISSION HAD, AT
EARLY SESSION, SET UP SECRETARIAT AND DEFINED ITS POWERS. SADRI
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EXPRESSED THOUGHT THAT PARTICULARLY HUNGDEL AND POLDEL WOULD HAVE

BEEN INTERESTED IN A WEAK SECRETARIAT AND CONSIDERED INDODEL AND CANDEL HAD MADE MAJOR MISTAKE BY NOT FIGHTING HARDER AT EARLIER STAGE FOR STRONG SECRETARIAT. HUNGDEL AND POLDEL POLICY WAS, OF COURSE, CONSISTENT WITH LINE SOVIETS HAD ALWAYS FOLLOWED ON SIMILAR POSITIONS IN UN AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS; POSITIONS SUCH AS ICCS DIRECTOR GENERAL WERE DELIBERATELY KEPT WEAK BY COMMUNISTS IN ORDER NOT TO WEAKEN AUTHORITY OF COMMUNIST DELEGATIONS.

4. SADRI SAID HE THOUGHT ICCS SHOULD ATTEMPT TO AVOID IN FUTURE PARTISAN DECISIONS AND POLEMICAL DISCUSSIONS. HE SAID ICCS SHOULD GET TOGETHER ON THOSE PROBLEMS IT CAN AGREE UPON, SUCH AS ORGANIZATION, BUDGET, FINANCES, ETC., AND REFRAIN FROM PARTISAN POSITIONS WHENEVER POSSIBLE. ICCS WAS A UNIT AND SHOULD NOT SPLINTER APART INTO FOUR COMPONENTS.

5. SADRI SAID HE HAD ALREADY HAD LENGTHY EXCHANGE OF VIEWS WITH NEW POLISH AMB KULAGA, WITH WHOM HE HAD WORKED ON QTE SENSITIVE QUESTIONS UNQTE IN UN BEFORE. HE FELT THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE WORK WELL WITH KULAGA IN ICCS CONTEXT AND ALREADY THEY HAD AGREED TO SOUND OUT EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS IN ADVANCE OF PLENARIES AND FINAL DECISIONS.

6. REGARDING IRANIAN DELEGATION, SADRI SAID THAT DEMAND FOR ICCS PERSONNEL WAS MEETING WITH SOME ADMINISTRATIVE RESISTANCE IN MINISTERIES FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND DEFENSE AS WELL. MFA WAS IN PROCESS OF OPENING NEW POSTS IN AFRICA AND LATIN AMERICA; DEFENSE WAS IN PROCESS OF REORGANIZATION. THUS, IT WAS DIFFICULT TO FIND AND GET COMPETENT PERSONNEL FOR ICCS.

7. SADRI SAID GOI WAS NOT COMMITTED TO SIX MONTH ROTATION POLICY ICCS HAD ADOPTED EARLIER. HE THOUGHT ROTATION AT END OF SIX MONTHS WAS BOTH EXPENSIVE AND INEFFICIENT. LIKELIHOOD WAS THAT IRANIAN TOUR OF DUTY WOULD BE ABOUT A YEAR.

8. SADRI SAID THAT IRAN DID NOT FEEL BOUND BY ANY DECISIONS OF EARLIER COMMISSION AND WOULD MAKE ITS OWN DECISIONS ON QUESTIONS AT THEY COME UP. HE HAD NOT AS YET BEEN PROVIDED WITH SET OF MINUTES OR DECISIONS TAKEN BY ICCS, NOR DID HE FEEL IT NECESSARY TO HAVE DETAILED KNOWLEDGE OF EARLIER ICCS ACTIONS. HE HAD SEEN SOME PLENARY CONFIDENTIAL

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RECORDS DURING BRIEFING IN ATHENS WITH AMB GAUVIN, AND GAUVIN HAD REFERRED TO SOME OF SESSIONS IN GREAT DETAIL.

9. ON COMMUNICATIONS WITH TEHRAN, SADRI SAID HE WAS TRYING TO ARRANGE FOR TELEX SERVICE. UNTIL THIS WAS COMPLETED, HE WOULD

APPRECIATE EMBASSY'S TRANSMITTAL OF MESSAGES FOR HIM AND OCCASIONAL
USE OF POUCH FACILITIES FOR REPORTS AND LETTERS TO THE SHAH.
APPLING

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